COMMENT
Sanctuary: The Legal Institution in England
I.

INTRODUCTION

Within the Minster of Beverley, at its liturgical center
next to the high altar, sits a stone chair that once bore the
inscription, "Haec sedes lapidea Freedstoll dicitur i.e. pacis
cathedra, ad quam reus fugiendo perveniens omnimodam habet
securitatem."1 On these words the sanctuary seeker relied as
he made his desperate way to the refuge that would protect
him from the penalties that the Common Law would enforce
against him.2 If he could reach the sanctuary limits of the
church, confess his crime to the clergy, and invoke the clergy's
protection, the fugitive escaped the reach of the criminal law.
For a time,' the walls erected by the clergy against the outside
world held the process of the king's law in suspense.
This Article discusses the institution of sanctuary that was
recognized under the Common Law of England from at least
the early Middle Ages until the Jacobean period, that is, from
1. J. C. Cox, THE

SANCTUARIES AND SANCTUARY SEEKERS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

128 (1911) (citing Camden and the glossaries of Du Cange and Spelman) [hereinafter
Cox]. The inscription can be translated, "This stone seat is called the Freedstoll, that
is, the chair of peace. Any fugitive who reaches it has complete safety.") (Author's
trans.).
2. Although the statistics are not definite, estimates of how many felons sought
sanctuary in medieval England put the number at about 1,000 per year. Cox, supra
note 1, at 33. The records of St. Cuthbert's in Durham, a major sanctuary since the
ninth century, show that 332 persons sought sanctuary for 243 different crimes
between the years 1464 to 1524. I. BAU, THIS GROUND Is HOLY 149 (1985) [hereinafter
BAU]. Most (195) of these sanctuary seekers were wanted for homicide; sixteen
were
debtors. Similarly, the Minster of Beverley received 469 sanctuary seekers between
the years 1478-1539. Most (200) of the fugitives were escaping prosecution for debt; 173
for murder; the rest for sundry crimes. Id
3. The length of the sanctuary period ranged anywhere from seven days under the
laws of Alfred the Great to forty days under later medieval enactments and charters.
Permanent asylum was a rare grant and differs in kind from the institution of
sanctuary considered in this article. The latter kind of sanctuary suspended the
normal operation of law; the former altered the fugitive's status such that the law had
no further effect on him. See Riggs, Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law, 18 SOCIAL
SCIENCES 4 (1963) [hereinafter Riggs].

University of Puget Sound Law Review

678

[Vol. 10:677

about the seventh to the seventeenth centuries A.D. This Article will not include a specific discussion of the modern American idea of sanctuary as the term is applied to the act of aiding
an alien to remain illegally in the United States to escape political persecution in the alien's own country. However, a consideration of the historical institution of sanctuary may shed light
on the contemporary issue in two ways. First, history reveals
that sanctuary as an ideology has deep roots in the consciousness of our modem society, which has been shaped by English
and Christian heritages. Old notions that religious values
should prevail over civil values (such as immigration control)
are surfacing in the arguments of modern sanctuary advocates.
Second, the contrast between historical sanctuary and presentday sanctuary should become clear. The main contrast, of
course, is that in the Middle Ages sanctuary was part of the
legal structure while now it is not.4 Medieval secular law permitted the practice of sanctuary because English lawmakers,
the kings and Parliament, deferred in certain matters to the
authority of the Church. Today, U.S. federal courts, interpreting the first amendment of the federal Constitution, have
rejected the argument that secular authority should defer to a
higher moral authority or to church law so as to allow the illegal harboring of aliens.5 Hence, sanctuary offered for religious
4. BAU, supra note 2, at 90, 92, 123.
After examining many references to sanctuary in American cases, Bau concludes

that "the legal privilege of sanctuary has never been directly considered by the
American courts ...

[and] remains one of the critical but unresolved questions raised

by the sanctuary movement." Id. at 90, 123.
Before 1985, the general concept of sanctuary had been addressed by American

courts, however, and had been held to lack any legal basis. Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment relates to the precincts of the home.., or office.
But it does not make them sanctuaries where the law cannot reach. [Although] [t]here

are such places in the world ...

[w]e have no sanctuaries here."); Osborn v. United

States, 385 U.S. 323, 346 (1966) ("A home is still a sanctuary . . . [but] [t]his does not
mean [one] can make his sanctuary invasion-proof against government agents. The

Constitution has provided a way whereby the home can lawfully be invaded, and that
is with a search warrant."); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217-20 (1981) (if
officers are in hot pursuit, a suspect may not take sanctuary in the home of another);

Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978) (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (the
Extradition Clause) was meant to protect against the balkanization of the criminal
justice system by preventing any state from offering sanctuary to fugitives from
another state); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (if
government agents comply with statutory requirements, the house is no sanctuary).

5. US. v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954 (1986) (free exercise of religion is limited when
it violates regulation for the protection of society); U.S. v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574

(1985).
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reasons presently receives no legal recognition in the United
States.6
Whether or not the sheltering of illegal aliens ought to be
immune from prosecution under the first amendment of the
Constitution is a consideration beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the historical perspective presented here may help
the reader to discover why sanctuary as a legal institution in
England became extinct. This perspective may also help the
reader to consider whether the legal and social structures of
today could support the re-establishment of sanctuary as a
legal institution.7

II.

SANCTUARY IN ENGLAND: THE BEGINNINGS

Sanctuary was already an ancient and respected convention at the time it became legally recognized in England in the
seventh century A.D." The Old Testament tells us that God
directed Moses to "set apart three cities to the east, beyond the
Jordan, where a man might find refuge who had killed his fellow unwittingly and with no previous feud against him; by taking flight to one of these cities he could save his life."9 The
Greek mind, too, conceived that some places should offer protection to the fugitive from justice. Thus, for example, Orestes
in Aeschylus' tragedy, The Eumenides,"° although guilty of
matricide, found safety at the sanctuary of Delphi under the
patronage of the god, Apollo. The Romans adopted the Greek
institution of temple asylum, although the typical trend during
the Roman period was to limit the use of sanctuary so as to
preserve it from abuse."
6. BAU, supra note 2, at 111-23; see supra note 4.
7. Because of its non-ecclesiastical nature, the constitutional power in the
Executive to suspend the process of law by a grant of pardon, reprieve, or commuted
sentence is also not discussed in this article. For a discussion of the pardoning power
vested in England's monarchs and the United States' presidents, see Grupp, Some
Historical Aspects of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. OF LEGAL HISTORY 51 (1963);
HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 14-15 (1941); 3 ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES: PARDON 27 (1939).
8. The time at which the sanctuary institution received legal recognition in

England is determined from written historical records. Sanctuary may have been
recognized under unrecorded law from an earlier period in one or more of the preNorman English kingdoms.
9. Deuteronomy 4:41-43 (THE JERUSALEM BIBLE, Darton, Longman & Todd ed.

1968).
10. One of the seven surviving plays written by Aeschylus, 525-456 B.C.
11. The limitations that Roman emperors placed on the sanctuary privilege

included (1) requiring temples to produce legal proofs of their right to exercise the
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The first legislation recognizing Christian churches as
sanctuaries was promulgated by Emperor Theodosius the
Great in 392 A.D. Theodosius' law did not introduce the privilege, but merely explained and regulated the right of sanctuary
attaching to churches. There is a strong suggestion, then, that
Christian churches operated as sanctuaries earlier than 392 and
probably from the time that Constantine declared Christianity
the official religion of Rome in 303 A.D. 2 In the fifth century,
the papacy confirmed the decrees of Theodosius the Younger
who in 450 extended the sanctuary protection from the church
building itself to the surrounding churchyard and precincts.' 3
In about the year 620, Pope Boniface V released legislation
again declaring the sanctuary privilege valid throughout
Christendom.

14

In 693, shortly after the sanctuary right was officially
promulgated by Boniface V, King Ine, the Christian ruler of
the West Saxons, introduced it into English secular law:' 5
If any one be guilty of a capital crime, and flee to the
church, let him have his life; but let him make satisfaction,
as right directs. If anyone forfeit his 16hide, and flee to the
church, let his lashes be forgiven him.
privilege, (2) restricting the privilege to only a temporary immunity from prosecution,
and (3) requiring the sanctuary seeker to present his legal defense before being
admitted to the sanctuary. These limitations responded to abuses of the sanctuary
practice, in an effort to "limit the protection of the sanctuary privilege for the
unfortunate and needy who would be unable to endure the often harsh and merciless
application of the criminal law." BAU, supra note 2, at 130.
12. Cox, supra note 1, at 2-3; BAU, supra note 2, at 131.
13. Cox, supra note 1, at 3; BAU, supra note 2, at 131.
14. Preface to SANCTUARIUM DUNELMENSE ET SANCTUARIUM BEVERLACENSE at xi

(Surtees Society ed. 1836) (citing Glossary in voce Sanctuarium, Sir Henry Spelman,
Concilia (1639): "Delinquentibus hic [Bonifacius V] templa et aras asyla constituit"
[hereinafter SANCTUARIUM].

This historical outline of sanctuary as it developed from Biblical times through the
early Christian period is not intended to be exhaustive. For a broader discussion of the
ancient tradition of sanctuary before its introduction in England, see, e.g., BAU, supra
note 2, at 124-133.
15. King Ethelbert of Kent had released legislation confirming the sanctity of the
church in 597 A.D. However, Ethelbert's law did not treat sanctuary specifically.
Rather, the law set out penalties for anyone who violated the Church's peace (frith or
fryth) by robbing the clergy or creating mischief within the church. The regulation
did not address the sanctuary situation, where a fugitive could invoke the Church's
protection against prosecution. Therefore, Ine's was the first sanctuary legislation in
England.
See Cox, supra note 1, at 6; BAU, supra note 2, at 134-35; 1 A COLLECTION OF THE
LAWS AND CANONS OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 84-85 (J. Johnson trans. 2d ed. Oxford

1850) (1st ed. London 1720) [hereinafter LAWS AND CANONS].
16. LAWS AND CANONS, supra note 15, at 133.
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Sanctuary was legally instituted in England in a time when the
ends of both ecclesiastical and secular governments were indistinct. King Ine's advisory council was composed partly of bishops, 17 who promoted the objectives of the Church. The early
kings of England who embraced these ecclesiastical objectives
believed that their duty to serve God and their duty to govern
were coextensive. Moreover, church law provided for them a
ready model that could be adopted for achieving political and
other governmental ends.
Royal dedication to ruling according to Christian precepts
is evident in the codes of Alfred the Great, issued in 877 A.D.,
about two centuries after Ine's sanctuary law, which transferred the bulk of the Book of Exodus into secular law.'
Promulgating his codes "out of that tenderness which Christ
taught towards the greatest crimes whatsoever decreed,"' 9
Alfred granted fugitives the right of sanctuary:
4. We also decree, That every church hallowed by a bishop
have this privilege, viz., If a foe run thither, that no man for
seven nights draw him from thence; if any man do, he incurs
the penalty of breaking the king's protection, and the
Church's peace (if he take more [men] from thence, the
[penalty] is the greater,) ...20
Thus, Alfred and other early English monarchs gave legislative
effect to the Scriptural ideal of granting pardon to the person
who makes his peace with God and men. At this stage in English legal history, then, the care of men's souls was clearly a
governmental as well as an ecclesiastical concern.
Apart from its religious effectiveness, however, the sanctuary institution was also a practical tool that early English kings
used to help keep the peace. The ancient Saxon law of bloodfeud gave injured parties the right to retaliate with force
against the offender or his family. To curtail the feuds, however, the communal law adopted a system whereby the
offender could pay damages (bot) to the injured party to buy
off the threat of feud. The greatest injuries could be offset
only by wergeld redemption (the value set on a man's life,
increasing with his rank).2 1 Later, the English kings rein17. SANcruARiuM, supra note 14, at xii.

18.
19.
20.
21.

LAWS AND CANONS, supra note 15, at 312-14.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 320.
See Miller, Choosing the Avenger: Some Aspects of the Bloodfeud in Medieval
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forced the prior communal efforts to prevent retaliatory conflicts. The law against robbery promulgated by King Ine
around 690 A.D. sought to eliminate feuds by specifying the
amount of money damages to be paid by the criminal to the
injured party or his relatives to make them whole.22 Similarly,
King Wihtred of Kent enacted a law in 696 A.D. that set out a
variety of penalties for thievery, including money damages.2 3
These laws forestalled the feud by removing the administration of justice from the hands of the injured parties and by
granting them a compensation other than blood for blood, life
for life. Further, the laws protected the thief-catcher from
retaliation by coloring his efforts with royal approbation: the
thief-catcher was rewarded with a portion of money damages
owed by the criminal. 24 Of course, the laws did not always successfully deter aggressive injured parties from taking the law
into their own hands. But as early as the seventh century the
secular government was taking innovative steps to bring under
its own control the means for distributing justice and keeping
the peace.
The practice of sanctuary dovetailed into the kings' peacekeeping scheme. Sanctuary removed the felon from the reach
of the injured party's retaliation. While in asylum, the felon
could negotiate amends with those seeking his blood by offering either wergeld redemption or debt slavery (reduction of the
criminal to the status of a dependent in bond to the injured
party). The negotiations were customarily conducted by the
clergy in charge of the sanctuary. Acting for the felon in an
intercessionary role, the clergy facilitated a quid pro quo settlement with the party seeking revenge. 25 Thus, by preventing
a feud, the settlement achieved the king's political purpose of
keeping the peace.
The legal institution of sanctuary, then, originated in England through the medium of the Church. The early English
kings, with the bishops in council, incorporated Scriptural
precepts and church law into secular codes to achieve Christian
ideals and political goals. With sanctuary legislation, the EngIceland and England, 1 LAW AND HISTORY REv. 159, 160-74 (1983); Riggs, supra note 3,
at 10.

22. See Riggs, supra note 3, at 10-11.
23. LAws AND CANONS, supra note 15, at 152.
24. Riggs, supra note 3, at 17-18; LAws AND CANONS, supra note 15, at 152 § 26:
"Let him that takes and overpowers [the thief] have half [the value of] him..
25. Riggs, supra note 3, at 22-23, 34.
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lish kings realized their Christian duty of leniency toward
penitents and encouraged peace by providing an alternative to
bloodfeud.
III.

THE TWO POWERS

In the later Middle Ages, the sanctuary institution did not
escape the political tensions that developed between the pope
and the king. As strong central governments developed in late
medieval England and on the Continent, and as the popes

became temporal rulers often in political opposition to European princes, the interests of civil and ecclesiastical authorities
diverged. Inevitably, civil rulers attempted more and more to
prevent the papacy from interfering in their internal political
affairs. Medieval thinkers, trying to reconcile the duality
between the Church and the State, began to articulate a kind
of territorialism that gave each authority its own place in a
universal order. Even as late as the mid-thirteenth century,
Thomas Aquinas2" found it necessary to reclarify the relationship between the separate secular and ecclesiastical powers in
his Scriptum super Sententiis: the Church had jurisdiction
over things concerning the salvation of souls, princes had
power over things concerning the civil good." Each power was
autonomous in its own order. Under this dualistic thesis, any
attempt by the king to regulate for the moral or spiritual
improvement of his subjects infringed on the autonomy of the
Church's spiritual authority. The reverse was also true; popes
were not empowered to regulate the strictly political lives of
Christians.
However, the separation of powers in the Middle Ages was
not complete either in concept or in practice. The idea of a
hierarchical order was still very much alive in the later Middle
Ages giving priority to the Church's authority when issues of
the salvation of souls and the civil good overlapped:
A king, the De regno holds, rules over his kingdom as a
priest (pope) rules over the kingdom of God; but he is sub26. Thomas Aquinas, 1225-1274, was a Dominican friar and theologian. He
authored several treatises and lesser works on theology and philosophy, among which
are his Commentaries on the works of Aristotle, Summa Theologica, Summa Contra
Gentiles, On Essence and Existence, Disputed Questions, and Scriptum Super
Sentintiis and De regno cited in the text infra. See BASIC WRrrINGS OF ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS (A. Pegis ed., New York 1945).
27. Boyle, The "De regno" and the Two Powers, PASTORAL CARE, CLERICAL
EDUCATION AND CANON LAW, 1200-1400, at 238 (1981).
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ject to the priest (pope) whenever there is a question of the
'dominium et regimen quod administrator per sacerdotis
officium' [citation omitted], that is, the salvation of souls, the
28
end or good that is extrinsic to that of the secular power.
Thus, a king theoretically was obligated to defer to the sovereignty of the Church in an affair like sanctuary where the
felon, presumptively, had not only sought the refuge to escape
criminal penalties, but also to place himself under the authority of the clergy to rectify his relationship with God.
In England, the transition from an ideological unanimity
towards a deferential coalition between secular and ecclesiastical governments, and its attendant effect on sanctuary, began
in the eleventh century. In the year 1018, King Cnute enacted
a law that recognized the differentiation between church and
secular law and, at the same time, subjected the secular judiciary to the precepts preached by the Church:
This is the secular provision, which I command, with the
advice of my wise men, to be observed over all England.
[c.1 omitted.]
2. We Charge, that though a man commit such a crime, as
to have forfeited himself to the last degree, yet let judicature
be so regulated, that it be moderate in respect to God, tolerable in respect to the world. And let him that presides in
judicature consider very seriously what he desires [of God]
when he thus says, "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive
them that trespass against us:" and that . . . the judicature
29
be tempered with gentleness, for the public benefit.
Although the ecclesiastical and secular priorities were clear in
Cnute's law, secular government was beginning to take shape
apart from the administration of the Church universal.
As the Church and the secular authorities acquired separate purposes and identities, the civil power took the next step.
From the Norman Conquest on, English kings began to restrict
the Church's prerogative in civil affairs that involved the welfare of souls. Among the changes that William the Conqueror
imposed on Saxon society was legislation concerning sanctuary.
Around the year 1070, William enacted, among other laws
relating to the rights and privileges of the Church, a regulation
0
concerning "Criminals fleeing to the Church."" With this law,
28. Id at 241.
29. LAWS AND CANONS, supra note 15, at 512.
30. "Et si more solito latro taliter egerit, et si forte fortuitu ad ecciesias vel ad
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William reshaped the sanctuary privilege. The law specified
that if a criminal sought sanctuary in a church or priest's house
several times, he had to leave the province, and no one in the
province could again receive the criminal without the express
permission of the king. This enactment set clearer boundaries
around the sanctuary privilege by limiting the number of times
a felon could invoke the privilege, by setting out where the
criminal could find asylum, and by prescribing a punishment to
deter sanctuary seekers from abusing the privilege. Most
important, however, was the limit that the law placed on the
Church's power to intervene in the execution of the secular
legal process: once the fugitive had been banished, the provincial church lost its jurisdiction over the fugitive unless the king
lifted the ban. Thus, King William began to set restrictions on
the Church's prerogative to offer sanctuary to the fugitive.
Nevertheless, William should not be perceived as an
enemy of the sanctuary institution. On the contrary, he wholeheartedly subscribed to the basic principle of sanctuary.3 1 Like
his seventh century predecessors, Ine and Wihtred,3 2 William
recognized the political value of the sanctuary institution as a
tool for keeping the peace during unsettled times. Often, however, the pacification function of sanctuary did not succeed
during William's reign because, unlike the more parochial disputes during Ine's and Wihtred's reigns, the grievous NormanSaxon conflicts militated against settlement during the relatively short cooling-off period.33 Without hope of conciliation
with his Norman prosecutors, the Saxon fugitive often refused
to submit to the secular arm for trial after the sanctuary
sacerdotis domus frequenter evaserit, ablatione restituta, provinciam foris
juret; et nisi reddat, nullus presumat eum hospitari, nisi a rege data licentia."
SANCTUARIUM, supra note 14, at xiii.
31. William chartered several sanctuaries during his reign. He granted some of
the broadest authorizations ever given as illustrated by his charter to Battle Abbey,
built after the Battle of Hastings to fulfill a vow. He established the abbey as a
sanctuary, specifically endowing it with the leuga, or league (one and a half miles), of
land that extended in all directions from the abbey's center. According to the
Chronicle of Battle Abbey, translated by M.A. Lower in 1851, "if any person guilty of
theft, manslaughter, or any other crime should, through fear of death, take refuge in
this abbey (that is, within the Leuga), he should receive no injury, but depart entirely
free. And if the abbot should chance, anywhere throughout the realm of England, to
meet any (capitally) condemned thief, robber, or other criminal, he should be at
liberty to release him from punishment." Cox, supra note 1, at 196-97.
32. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 3.
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period had elapsed.'
To make the sanctuary system work more effectively, William enacted the provision mentioned above, 5 requiring a
criminal who abused the sanctuary privilege to quit his province and his clergy's protection, or else submit to the process of
law. This requirement was the precursor of the later prescription, abjuration of the realm, under which the fugitive could
choose exile from Britain over the execution of criminal process against him.3 6
The revolutionary character of William's seemingly minor
modification of the sanctuary convention to effect his political
purposes cannot be appreciated without a brief digression to
explain the institutional strength of the papacy that prevailed
from the early Middle Ages, through the time of William, and
beyond. Although the scope of this Article prevents a thorough analysis of papal influence over medieval kings, the theory of the papacy's power that compelled the kings' deference
to the authority of the Church can be briefly stated.
Medieval church doctrine taught that the pope, the bishop
of Rome, was the successor to the chair of Peter, the seat of
In the mid-fifth century, Pope Leo I expanded
authority.37
the doctrine of apostolic succession, expressing the pope's right
to primacy in "exclusively juristic terms" taken from Roman
law.3 8 Leo I characterized the pope as heir, "indignus haeres,"
of Peter. Under Roman law, the heir assumed all the assets
and liabilities of the deceased, and thus had the legal duty to
function exactly as his predecessor had done in relation to
others. 9 In his official capacity as Peter's heir, the pope
assumed the power to govern the faithful that had been conferred by Christ upon Peter.4 ° When exercising his plenary
34. Cox, supra note 1, at 11.
35. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

36. The right to abjure the realm dates from the twelfth century. An early statute
of King Henry II declared at Clarendon in 1164 provided:
And if [the fugitive] confess a mortal offence, and desire to depart the realm
without desiring the tuition of the Church, he is to go from the end of the
sanctuary ungirt in pure sackcloth, and there swear that he will keep the
straight path to such a port ... never to return during the King's life without
leave, so help him God and the good Evangelists...
Cox, supra note 1, at 24.
37. See ULLMAN, Leo I and the Theme of Papal Primacy, THE CHURCH AND THE
LAW OF THE EARLIER MIDDLE AGES § IV, 29 (1975).

38. Idi at 33.
39. Id at 33-36.
40. John 21: 15-17.
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Petrine powers, the pope's juristic decisions were binding on
the whole Church; kings were no exception. In light of this
theoretical papal authority, any interference with established
church practice would have required the pope's sanction.
In the eleventh century, then, when King William placed
tighter restrictions on the use of sanctuaries, he was stepping
into the province of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, challenging the
juristic control that the Church had heretofore exercised over
the sanctuary seeker. William's challenge to the Church on
sanctuary exemplifies his readiness to stretch the boundaries
of his own legal control. In contrast to the period just before
the Conquest when the law was Christianized, 4' brought into
conformity with ecclesiastical principles, William's reign was
marked by an increasing tension between civil and church
authorities. This tension pervaded the Middle Ages from William's time on. It ended in the sixteenth century when Henry
VIII polarized the conflict between pope and English king.
The ensuing schism between England and Rome, which will
receive further treatment in part IV below, terminated the
simultaneous reign of the two powers. Henry VIII's predecessors, however, had dealt with the tension through more conciliatory means, working to establish through appropriate
legislation and extra-legal accommodations the congruity
between civil and church governance that medieval thinkers
like Thomas Aquinas had described.' To a significant extent,
then, the sanctuary convention owed its continuation after the
Norman Conquest to the peculiarly medieval sense of duty
that called English rulers to defer to the authority of the pope
in spiritual matters.
A specific illustration of how the sanctuary process
worked in the later Middle Ages will clarify the extent to
which the fifteenth century English king allowed abrogation of
his jurisdiction over a fugitive. It will also give an idea of the
sociological ramifications of sanctuary in that period.
41. Riggs, supra note 3, at 50-54.
42. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. One manifestation of the Church's
governmental presence in England was the existence of church courts. In general,
these courts had jurisdiction over legal issues with moral ramifications, such as
divorce, sexual crimes, breach of faith and petty debt, probate, and, of course,
violations of religious obligations, e.g., tithing. For a discussion of the operation of
Church courts in London in the early sixteenth century, see R.M. WUNDERLI, LONDON
CHURCH COURTS AND SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION (1981)
MEDIEVAL

[hereinafter

For a study of earlier medieval church courts, see S. BROWN, THE
COURTS OF THE YORK MINSTER PECULIAR (1984).

WUNDERLI].
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In the register of St. Cuthbert's Shrine at Durham Abbey,
a sanctuary recognized since the ninth century,43 is the following account of a certain fugitive named Colson:
Memorandum, That on 13 May, 1467, one Colson, of Wolsingham, co. Durham, who had been detected in theft, and
for that reason apprehended and lodged in [jail], managed at
length to escape, and fled to the cathedral church of Durham on account of its immunity of rest. Whilst standing
44
near the shrine of St. Cuthbert, he prayed that a coroner
might be assigned to him. On the arrival of John Raket, coroner of the ward of Chester-le-Street, Colson made confession of his felony, and standing there took his corporal oath
of abjuring the realm of England with as much dispatch as
possible and of never returning. This oath he took at the
shrine of St. Cuthbert before George Cornforth, sacristan of
the Cathedral church of Durham, Ralph Bows, knight and
sheriff of co. Durham, John Raket, Robert Thrylkett, undersheriff, Hugh Noland, Nicholas Dixson, and many others.
By reason of which renunciation and oath all Colson's accoutrements were forfeited by right to the aforesaid sacristan as
pertaining to his office. Therefore Colson was ordered to
take off his clothes to his shirt and to deliver them to the
sacristan for his disposal; and when the sacristan had
received them all, he freely gave them up and restored to
the fugitive all the clothes which he had up to then been
wearing. After that Colson departed from the church, and
was delivered by the Sheriff to the nearest constables, and so
on from constables to constables, holding a white cross made
of wood, as a fugitive, and was thus conducted to the nearest
seaport, there to take ship and never to return.45
In the above account, there appear several procedural elements
that were common to every sanctuary action in the later Middle Ages. First, the fugitive had to reach the sanctuary location. The area protected at Durham was "all the Church yard,
and all the circuyte therof. '' 46 Because Colson had arrived at
the church itself, he was protected under the cathedral's sanctuary charter.
43. Cox, supra note 1, at 96-97.
44. The Oxford English Dictionary defines coronor as: "An officer of a county,
district, or municipality (formerly also of the royal household), originally charged with
maintaining the rights of private property of the crown; .
OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 562 (Compact ed. 1971).
45. SANCTUARIUM, supra note 14, at 30-31; Cox, supra note 1, at 113-14.
46. Cox, supra note 1, at 119 (citing the RIGHTS OF DURHAM (1593)).
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Second, the fugitive had to confess his guilt and then
choose whether to negotiate his sentence or to abjure the
realm.4 7 Colson chose the latter.
Third, upon abjuration, the fugitive was granted passage
under the supervision of the civil authorities to the port of the
coroner's choice, usually the one nearest to the sanctuary. The
coroner's participation in the sanctuary process is an important
point because it demonstrates that the civil authorities cooperated fully with the fugitive's exercise of his sanctuary right.
Also evident, however, is the civil authorities' readiness to
reclaim their suspended jurisdiction over the fugitive if he terminated his sanctuary right through misconduct.4 8
Last, the fugitive had to assume a penitential attitude during his time in sanctuary. As a sign of repentance of his crime,
Colson gave up his worldly possessions and his clothing to the
clerics attending him. In Colson's case, the clerics returned his
clothing to him for an unidentified reason.4 9 In other accounts,
however, sanctuary seekers were given special clothes to wear
that gave the public notice of their protected (although criminal) status:
[A]nd everyone of them [was] to have a gowne of blacke
cloth maid with a cross of yeallowe cloth, called Sancte
Cuthbert's cross, sett on his lefte shoulder of his arme, to th'
intent that every one might se that there was such a prelige
graunted by God and Sancte Cuthbert, for every such
offender to flie unto for succor and safegard of there lyves
50

Even though Colson did not wear the abjuror's special dress,
he did carry a "white cross made of wood" on his way to the
seaport, thus complying with the procedural requirement of
making his protected status publicly known.
In general, so long as the sanctuary seeker observed the
formalities of the convention, the king also observed sanctuary
formalities, temporarily shielding the sanctuary seeker from
the secular legal process. The king also protected the sanctu47. Id. at 118.
48. The sanctuary privilege could terminate if the fugitive left the protected area
or if the sanctuary period peculiar to the asylum church or house expired without the
fugitive taking the abjuration oath. See supra notes 3, 31, 46 and accompanying text.
49. The ritual of giving up clothing and having it returned may have symbolized
that the abjuror no longer had any rights or public privileges and was now solely
dependent on the Church for his welfare. BAU, supra note 2, at 147.
50. COX, supra note 1, at 119-20 (citing the RIGHTS OF DURHAM (1593)).
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ary seeker from retaliation by injured parties-severely pun-

ishing violators of the privilege under the secular law.5

The

Church, too, often imposed even harsher sanctions on violators.52 Thus, in spite of the growing tension between the two
powers, the sanctuary institution survived throughout the later
Middle Ages.
IV.

THE END OF THE SANCTUARY INSTITUTION IN ENGLAND

Eventually, the tension between the two powers, the pope

and the English government, became so strained that sanctuary as an institution ended. 3 The decline of sanctuary began
when Henry VII instigated legal reforms that prevented a
felon from invoking sanctuary when the crime involved was
treason or suspicion of treason.

Henry VIII continued his

father's efforts to weaken the institution by introducing harsh
penalties for the sanctuary man, thus making the exercise of

the sanctuary right less desirable to the felon. Finally, James I
repealed the right of sanctuary altogether toward the end of

his reign. The reasons why the Tudor kings and James I found
it necessary to phase out the sanctuary institution will be discussed more fully below. First, however, it is important to
look at (in a general way at least) some of the factors that dis-

placed the centrality of the Roman Church in England during
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, opening the door for the
51. The following entry in the Close Rolls at the Public Records Office, London,
illustrates that the violators of the sanctuary right were subject to criminal
prosecution:
1309, April 4. - To the sheriff of Berkshire. Order to cause jurors to appear
before Henry Spigurnel and Richard de Wyndesor, whom the king has
appointed to enquire what malefactors and breakers of the peace dragged
certain prisoners lately detained in the king's prison of the town of Windsor
for larcenies and other trespasses charged against them, who had escaped
from the same prison and fled to the churchyard of Windsor for sanctuary,
from the said churchyard by force of arms, and led them back to the same
prison, slaying and beheading certain of them on the way back, and to inquire
the names of those thus slain and of the survivors, and all the circumstances
of the same.
Cox, supra note 1, at 264.
52. In the year 1200, the bishop of Lincoln Cathedral excommunicated the bailiff
and his accomplices who had dragged a fugitive thief from the sanctuary church and
hanged him. To reinstate themselves in the Church's favor, the bishop gave the
offenders a shocking penance. They had to carry the decaying corpse of the hanged
fugitive on their bare shoulders for almost a mile to the church of Brackley, bear it
round the church while being scourged, and then give the corpse an honorable burial.
Id. at 211.
53. See supra text at 687.
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kings' legal reforms.'
The "secularization" of Continental and English societies
during the early modern period was one of the primary characteristics of a new, post-medieval age.55 The term "seculariza-

tion" does not imply that Renaissance men were any less
concerned with religion or theological inquiries than their
medieval predecessors. Rather, the term connotes a change in
attitude that liberated theological thinking from a slavish conformity with the doctrines and hierarchical model that had
been the hallmark of Thomistic scholasticism' and the Dantesque cosmological57 view. The attitudinal change had its
basis in a new skepticism5 8 that arose out of humanism, the
classical academic discipline that stressed learning through
close observation and that developed a strong sense of civic virtue aimed at building a perfect society. Different modalities of
54. A thorough study of the factors that brought on the transition from the
Middle Ages to the Renaissance is far beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless,
any consideration of legal reform that was conditioned upon such a fundamental shift
in sociological, philosophical, and theological perception would be incomplete without
some discussion of the transition, however brief.
55. WUNDERLI, supra note 42, at 1.

56. THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICIONARY 2665 (Compact ed. 1971). Scholasticism ...
1. The doctrines of the schoolmen, the predominant theological and philosophical
teaching of the period A.D. 1000-1500, based upon the authority of the Christian
Fathers and of Aristotle and his commentators....
Id. Thomas Aquinas' contribution to scholastic thought can be observed, e.g., in
his Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics, On the Soul, On the Sensed, and On
Reminiscences; Summa Theologica; Summa Contra Gentiles; On Essence and
Existence; and Disputed Questions. (Thomas Aquinas, like other scholastic thinkers,
endeavored to harmonize the philosphy of Aristotle with the Christian Fathers and to
synthesize moral and political sciences. His writings represent mainstream medieval
thought.)
57. Dante Alighieri, the Florentine poet and political activist, is best known for his
work, La Divina Commedia (The Divine Comedy), completed shortly before Dante
died in 1321. As systematic in its form as it is in its message about the way to
salvation, the Commedia presents a cosmos completely organized, both physically and
metaphysically, according to the theocentric vision of his age. Regarding Dante's
representation of thirteenth century thought, John D. Sinclair, in the Preface to his
translation of the Inferno, the first of the books of the Commedia, writes:
Dante did not merely inherit the theology and cosmology of the Middle Ages
along with his generation and then take them for granted; he re-imagined
them and peopled them . . . He was a great interpreter and a supreme
imaginer, bodying forth the abstractions of scholastic thinking ... and it is
only as we provisionally accept the ethical and theological system and
standards of the thirteenth century and hold in mind its conceptions of the
world and life and eternity that we can enter into the mind and imagination
of the poet.
J. Sinclair, Preface to Dante's Inferno 10-11 (1961).
58. J. PLUMB, THE PENGUIN BOOK OF THE RENAISSANCE 29 (1964).
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reasoning replaced the medieval method of rationalization that
deduced particular truths from general axioms. Within this
fresh intellectual environment, thinkers introduced new
approaches to government (e.g., Niccolo Machiavelli), to art
(e.g., Leonardo da Vinci), and to religion (e.g., Martin Luther).
The Church, as it had existed throughout the Middle Ages,
was subjected to close scrutiny, not only by iconoclasts such as
Martin Luther, but by those who wished to work within the
existing structure towards reform. Erasmus, the great Dutch
humanist, was welcomed to England by Thomas More (who
was later to be Henry VIII's chancellor and who was loyal to
Rome). Like More, Erasmus was no Protestant, 59 but he was a
critic of the conservatism of the Church. At the suggestion of
Thomas More, Erasmus wrote Encomium Moriae (The Praise
of Folly) in 1509, a scathing satire of the Church's abuses and
stodginess.
Whether reform was encouraged by moderates like More
and Erasmus or by strident Protestants like Luther, the traditional role of the Church as the supreme arbiter of men's spiritual affairs and governor of men's souls lost its force.
Replacing the institutional absolutism of the papacy was the
growing sense that each person could find his way to sanctity
through his own spirituality and mystical experience. Hence,
the function of the pope as intermediary between Christ and
the Church faded in importance; for Protestants, the pope's
function became altogether superfluous.
English secularization and disaffection for the papacy that
contributed to sanctuary's eventual demise not only had ideological (humanistic) roots, but also sociological and political
ones. First, and perhaps most obvious, Rome was a long distance from England and it lay in a country that was culturally
very different from England. The combination of distance and
cultural difference prevented the common, non-academic
Englishman from closely identifying with the papacy, a creature of southern European culture. Second, the papacy had
acquired a reputation for manifest corruption that was
exploited by reformers throughout Europe. 60 Fervent reformers in England, seeking to renew the purity of the Church,
were anxious to dissociate themselves from a corrupt religious
authority. Third, the pope demanded from his clergy financial
59. Id. at 302.
60. THE POPES, A CONCISE BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 284 (E. John ed. 1964).
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support for launching military campaigns and administering
the government of the papal territories. The clergy's source
for these funds was the laity; the funds were collected through
excessive taxes and tithes." The Reformation environment
presented laymen with an opportunity to relieve themselves of
their fiscal obligation to Rome by denying the authority of the
pope. Last, and probably most important from a legal point of
view, English laymen perceived that church courts, at least in
many parts of the country, had ceased to provide a system of
procedural and substantive justice that could compete effectively with the secular courts. 62 Aggrieved laymen, therefore,
had no incentive to prolong, through use, the life of abusive
ecclesiastical institutions. Against this backdrop of lay disaffection, described above, the Tudors and James I would find
the eventual abolition of church institutions a relatively easy
task. Among the institutions that they targeted for elimination
was sanctuary.
In 1485, Henry VII, the first Tudor king, laid claim to the
English throne, thereby ending the long struggle between the
partisans of Lancaster and York called the War of the Roses.
Assuming power as a de facto king,6 3 Henry's chief interest was
to establish his supremacy in England and ensure the legitimate succession of his line. To accomplish this purpose, Henry
assumed the power needed to immunize him from the potential challenges to his kingship from rival political sources. In
so doing, Henry VII acquired
the mass of powers, rights, and immunities which distinguished a king from a private individual. In him was centered that popular belief in the sanctity and the miraculous
61. R. RODES, JR., ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 197200 (1977); WUNDERLI, supra note 42, at 108.
62. WUNDERLI, supra note 42, at 1-5.
There was . .. a move away from--and a disenchantment with-church court
jurisdiction ... and a corresponding appeal . .. to secular authorities to hear
"spiritual" suits.... Church courts seem to have appeared ... after
the 1490s
lax and incapable of bringing wrongdoers to justice.... Secular justice in the
mayor's court was much harsher than church court justice ....
[L]itigants

seem to have come to expect the immediate results which the secular courts
could provide. Hence, there was a shift in the "dynamic center" of
overlapping legal systems, from ecclesiastical to secular-and with this shift a
"reformation" of laymen's loyalties, a secularization of
attitudes [citation
omitted].
Id. at 2.
63. D. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 8

(9th ed. 1969).
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powers of kingship which had always been connected with
the royal office. Into his hands fell all the property, and the
dues payable from the property of the subject, which formed
the estate of the Crown. All that kingship implied was
Henry's, to make of it what use he could.'
Insecure as he was about his claim to the throne, Henry VII
adopted as a political imperative the prevention of treason and
the uninhibited punishment of traitors. In 1487, Henry VII
sought and obtained a papal bull from Pope Innocent VIII that
precluded traitors and those suspected of treason from invoking the sanctuary privilege. Innocent's successors, Popes Alexander VI and Julius II, confirmed this preclusion for Henry in
1493 and 1504, respectively. 65 Having succeeded in placing this
limitation on the sanctuary practice, Henry VII entered the St.
Martin's Sanctuary in 1495 to drag forth four persons who had
been accused of publicly and seditiously maligning him.6
Three of the four accused were hanged in February, 1496; the
fourth plead for restoration to the sanctuary and was reprieved
until the next judicial term.67 Thus, Henry VII began to revise
the sanctuary institution, eliminating its application to a certain class of felons. But it was not until Henry VIII's reign
(1509-1547), when the anti-ecclesiastical sentiments had
reached a peak,68 that greater restrictions were enforced.
Soon after Henry VIII took the throne, he began to materially alter the sanctuary privilege. Henry VIII's reasons for
the alterations were the same as his father's had been: to
ensure the political supremacy of the king and the swift execution of legal process against offenders threatening the tranquility of the land. In addition to these reasons, however, was
Henry's contest with the institutional Church, which directly
opposed his political scheme to divorce Catherine of Aragon
and marry Anne Boleyn in hopes of producing a male heir.
When Henry VIII declared his divorce in spite of Rome's objections, the schism between Rome and England began. Henry's
ultimate act of defiance toward the pope was to divest the pope
of authority in England by declaring himself the head of the
69
English church.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Cox, supra note 1, at 93; SANCTUARIUM, supra note 14, at xxi.
66. Cox, supra note 1, at 92-93.

67. Id.
68. See supra text at 690-93.
69. Statute 26 Henry VIII, c.1 (1534):
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Henry VIII's earliest legislation regarding sanctuary dates
from 1512. Entitled, "How Plea of Sanctuary in a foreign shire
shall be tried," the statute denied the sanctuary immunity to a
felon asylumed in a foreign county when the king's attorney or
any other person would swear that the felon had been seized at
large in the same shire where he was arraigned.7" Since such
testimony was easily had, given the state of criminal investigative process in the sixteenth century, the sanctuary privilege
was effectively denied to any felon asylumed in a foreign
county.
In 1529, Henry VIII promulgated another statute that
required all sanctuary men and abjurors to be branded with
the letter "A" on the thumb, or else lose all sanctuary privileges. 7' The statute 22 Henry VIII, c. xiv (1530-31) effectively
abolished the former right of felons to abjure the realm. Fearful that skilled archers and mariners and those privy to state
secrets would abjure and pass on their knowledge to foreigners, Henry prescribed that the abjuror be taken to a sanctuary
place within the kingdom to be kept there for the rest of his
life unless pardoned by the king. Any abjuror who attempted
to leave the sanctuary was subject to trial for his offense or to
death.7 2
Statute 26 Henry VIII, c. xiii (1534) proscribed the sanctuary privilege for any person accused of high treason.7 3 Statute
32 Henry VIII, c. xii (1540) abolished all special sanctuaries
(those chartered by the king) except Wells, Westminster,
Northampton, Norwich, York, Derby, Manchester, and
Launcester. The statute left intact the immunity of parish
churches and churchyards, cathedral churches, hospitals, collegiate churches, and dedicated chapels. Additionally, the law
eliminated sanctuary for criminals guilty of rape, murder, burglary, robbery, arson, sacrilege, and for accessories to such
crimes.7 4
[B]e it enacted by authority of his present parliament that the king our
sovereign lord, his heirs and successors kings of this realm, shall be taken,

accepted and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of

England called Anglicana Ecclesia...
Id (cited in M. EvANs AND R.I. JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 244 (1984)).
70. COX, supra note 1, at 320-21.

71. Id. at 321.
72. d; SANCTuARIUM, supra note 14, at xii.
73. Cox, supra note 1, at 322; SANCTUARIUM, supra note 14, at xxii.

74. Cox, supra note 1, at 326; SANCTUAmUM, supra note 14, at xxii-xxii.
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The above enactments collectively all but ended the institution of sanctuary as it had existed in England since the seventh century A.D. The rest of the Tudor monarchs, except
Mary Tudor, maintained Henry VIII's statutes without substantial modification. The brief attempts of Mary Tudor to
restore the sanctuary privilege (and Catholicism) in England
were quickly repealed when Elizabeth I came to power.7 5 Nevertheless, the enactments finally abolishing the sanctuary institution altogether were not passed until the reign of James I.
In 1604, the statute 1 James I, c. 25 eliminated the eight
remaining chartered sanctuaries:
And be it also enacted by the Authoritie of this present Parliament, That so much of all Statutes as concerneth abjured
Persons and Sanctuaries, or ordering or governing of Persons abjured or in sanctuaries, made before the five and thirElizabeth's Reigne, shall also
tieth yeere of the late Queene
76
stand repealed and be voide.
By 1624, sanctuary immunity that had attached to all other
places, such as parish churches and their yards, was repealed
by 21 James I, c. 28.
James I's absolute proscription of the sanctuary privilege
was the final step in removing the ecclesiastical power to suspend the process of secular criminal law. James' reasons were
identical to those of his predecessors: he desired to consolidate
79
7s
in himself, as lex loquens all "divine power on earth.
Therefore, he would not share any prerogative of a legal or
governmental character with the Church.
V.

CONCLUSION

In England, the sanctuary institution's legal validity
depended on the vitality of the Church as a sovereign governmental authority having jurisdiction over the welfare of men's
souls. During the early Middle Ages, kings saw their duty to
govern as coextensive with the Church's charter to bring all
men to God. In that period, the sanctuary privilege was so
75. Cox, supra note 1, at 328.
76. 1& at 329.
77. IdM; SANCTUARIUM, supra note 14, at xxxiii.
78. Literally translated "the speaking law." The more idiomatic sense is that
James' every word was law. JAMES I, WORKS 530 (1616) (cited in M. EVANS AND R.I.
JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 304).
79. Id at 528 (cited in M. EVANS AND R.I. JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 303).
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interwoven into the social fabric that only the barest statutory
reference was required to give it legal effect. During the later
Middle Ages, as the political agendas of kings and popes
diverged, the sanctuary institution survived in an atmosphere
of tension where the two powers vied for governmental
supremacy. With the arrival of the Renaissance and the Reformation in England, the kings succeeded in throwing off their
reliance on the papacy for normative approbation. Once
independent of papal control, and asserting their own primacy
in divine affairs, the kings abolished the sanctuary institution
and thereby perfected their jurisdiction over the felon.
The critical question for the English kings was whether or
not they could tolerate the presence of a foreign authority that
limited the sovereignty of the civil government. On that issue,
the survival of the sanctuary institution turned. In the end,
the kings decided that the sacrifice of sovereignty was too
great; they expelled the pope from England, and sanctuary
along with him. Seen in the light of sanctuary's history in
England, modern proponents of sanctuary seem to be trying to
reinstate the institution that Henry VIII and his successors
abolished. Contemporary sanctuary advocates ask whether a
moral imperative (as perceived by those sheltering illegal
aliens) can abrogate the federal government's jurisdiction over
immigration affairs. Thus far, the courts' basis for disallowing
sanctuary has been that the practice would interfere with the
federal power to regulate for the protection of society.8 0 Thus,
one can conclude that the historical and modern limits on sanctuary are directed toward the same end, ensuring the exercise
of the civil government's power through the uninhibited process of the criminal law. So far, it seems, American courts
have travelled the path laid down by Henry VIII. Nevertheless, the sanctuary idea survives, if not as a legal alternative, at
least as a relic of a more synthetic age.
Steven Pope

80. See supra note 5.

